THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EURO
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EURO
In February 1992, EC members signed a treaty (the Maastricht Treaty) that committed them to adopting a common currency by January 1, 1999.14 The euro is now used by 17 of the 27 member-states of the European Union; these 17 states are members of what is often referred to as the euro zone. It encompasses 330 million EU citizens and includes the powerful economies of Germany and France. Many of the countries that joined the EU on May 1, 2004, and the two that joined in 2007, originally planned to adopt the euro when they fulfilled certain economic criteria—a high degree of price stability, a sound fiscal situation, stable exchange rates, and converged long-term interest rates (the current members had to meet the same criteria). However, the events surrounding the EU sovereign debt crisis of 2010–2012 persuaded many of these countries to put their plans on hold, at least for the time being (further details provided later).
Maastricht Treaty
Treaty agreed to in 1991, but not ratified until January 1, 1994, that committed the 12 member-states of the European Community to adopt a common currency.
Establishment of the euro was an amazing political feat with few historical precedents. It required participating national governments to give up their own currencies and national control over monetary policy. Governments do not routinely sacrifice national sovereignty for the greater good, indicating the importance that the Europeans attach to the euro. By adopting the euro, the EU has created the second most widely traded currency in the world after that of the U.S. dollar. Some believe that the euro could come to rival the dollar as the most important currency in the world.
Three long-term EU members—Great Britain, Denmark, and Sweden—are still sitting on the sidelines. The countries agreeing to the euro locked their exchange rates against each other January 1, 1999. Euro notes and coins were not actually issued until January 1, 2002. In the interim, national currencies circulated in each participating state. However, in each country the national currency stood for a defined amount of euros. After January 1, 2002, euro notes and coins were issued and the national currencies were taken out of circulation. By mid-2002, all prices and routine economic transactions within the euro zone were in euros.
Benefits of the Euro
Europeans decided to establish a single currency in the EU for a number of reasons. First, they believe that businesses and individuals realize significant savings from having to handle one currency, rather than many. These savings come from lower foreign exchange and hedging costs. For example, people going from Germany to France no longer have to pay a commission to a bank to change German deutsche marks into French francs. Instead, they are able to use euros. According to the European Commission, such savings amount to 0.5 percent of the European Union’s GDP, or about $80 billion a year.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the adoption of a common currency makes it easier to compare prices across Europe. This has been increasing competition because it has become easier for consumers to shop around. For example, if a German finds that cars sell for less in France than Germany, he may be tempted to purchase from a French car dealer rather than his local car dealer. Alternatively, traders may engage in arbitrage to exploit such price differentials, buying cars in France and reselling them in Germany. The only way that German car dealers will be able to hold on to business in the face of such competitive pressures will be to reduce the prices they charge for cars. As a consequence of such pressures, the introduction of a common currency has led to lower prices, which translates into substantial gains for European consumers.
Third, faced with lower prices, European producers have been forced to look for ways to reduce their production costs to maintain their profit margins. The introduction of a common currency, by increasing competition, has produced long-run gains in the economic efficiency of European companies.
Fourth, the introduction of a common currency has given a boost to the development of a highly liquid pan-European capital market. Over time, the development of such a capital market should lower the cost of capital and lead to an increase in both the level of investment and the efficiency with which investment funds are allocated. This could be especially helpful to smaller companies that have historically had difficulty borrowing money from domestic banks. For example, the capital market of Portugal is very small and illiquid, which makes it extremely difficult for bright Portuguese entrepreneurs with a good idea to borrow money at a reasonable price. However, in theory, such companies can now tap a much more liquid pan-European capital market.
Finally, the development of a pan-European, euro-denominated capital market will increase the range of investment options open to both individuals and institutions. For example, it will now be much easier for individuals and institutions based in, let’s say, Holland to invest in Italian or French companies. This will enable European investors to better diversify their risk, which again lowers the cost of capital, and should also increase the efficiency with which capital resources are allocated.15
ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE Can the Euro Survive 2012?
With the current eurozone crisis the question is, will the euro survive? The answer lies in examining several interesting facts of the European Union. First, the lack of a European treasury is the missing piece of the puzzle. Without it, the ECB is limited in the assistance it can provide to eurozone member states. In theory, the ECB could bail out those member states burdened with excessive debt by printing more money. However, that would require the approval of all 27 member states (not just the 17 eurozone that use the euro as their national currency) that make up the EU. Germany is opposed to any such measure that may light the fires of inflation. Some of the EU members also think it is unfair to bail out those states that have lived beyond their means for many years now. It is difficult to compare the difficulties within the EU to those of other nations that have faced similar problems and survived. That’s because the EU is not a cohesive nation. The 27 member nations of the EU are separated geographically. In addition, they literally and figuratively don’t even speak the same language. United States has a vested interest in EU[;] the collapse of the EU, or the euro, would have an impact on the U.S. economy. The eurozone by itself is the United States’ third-largest export destination, accounting for 15 percent of total U.S. exports.
Source: http://seekingalpha.com/article/565381-can-the-euro-survive-2012.
Costs of the Euro
The drawback, for some, of a single currency is that national authorities have lost control over monetary policy. Thus, it is crucial to ensure that the EU’s monetary policy is well managed. The Maastricht Treaty called for establishment of the independent European Central Bank (ECB), similar in some respects to the U.S. Federal Reserve, with a clear mandate to manage monetary policy so as to ensure price stability. The ECB, based in Frankfurt, is meant to be independent from political pressure—although critics question this. Among other things, the ECB sets interest rates and determines monetary policy across the euro zone.
The implied loss of national sovereignty to the ECB underlies the decision by Great Britain, Denmark, and Sweden to stay out of the euro zone. Many in these countries are suspicious of the ECB’s ability to remain free from political pressure and to keep inflation under tight control.
In theory, the design of the ECB should ensure that it remains free of political pressure. The ECB is modeled on the German Bundesbank, which historically has been the most independent and successful central bank in Europe. The Maastricht Treaty prohibits the ECB from taking orders from politicians. The executive board of the bank, which consists of a president, vice president, and four other members, carries out policy by issuing instructions to national central banks. The policy itself is determined by the governing council, which consists of the executive board plus the central bank governors from the 17 euro zone countries. The governing council votes on interest rate changes. Members of the executive board are appointed for eight-year nonrenewable terms, insulating them from political pressures to get reappointed. Nevertheless, the jury is still out on the issue of the ECB’s independence, and it will take some time for the bank to establish its credentials.
According to critics, another drawback of the euro is that the EU is not what economists would call an optimal currency area. In an optimal currency area, similarities in the underlying structure of economic activity make it feasible to adopt a single currency and use a single exchange rate as an instrument of macroeconomic policy. Many of the European economies in the euro zone, however, are very dissimilar. For example, Finland and Portugal have different wage rates, tax regimes, and business cycles, and they may react very differently to external economic shocks. A change in the euro exchange rate that helps Finland may hurt Portugal. Obviously, such differences complicate macroeconomic policy. For example, when euro economies are not growing in unison, a common monetary policy may mean that interest rates are too high for depressed regions and too low for booming regions.
Optimal Currency Area
One where similarities among the economic structures of countries make it feasible to adopt a single currency.
One way of dealing with such divergent effects within the euro zone is for the EU to engage in fiscal transfers, taking money from prosperous regions and pumping it into depressed regions. Such a move, however, opens a political can of worms. Would the citizens of Germany forgo their “fair share” of EU funds to create jobs for underemployed Greece workers? Not surprisingly, there is strong political opposition to such practices.
The Euro Experience: 1999 to the Sovereign Debt Crisis
Since its establishment January 1, 1999, the euro has had a volatile trading history against the world’s major currency, the U.S. dollar. After starting life in 1999 at €1 = $1.17, the euro steadily fell until it reached a low of €1 = $0.83 in October 2000, leading critics to claim the euro was a failure. A major reason for the fall in the euro’s value was that international investors were investing money in booming U.S. stocks and bonds and taking money out of Europe to finance this investment. In other words, they were selling euros to buy dollars so that they could invest in dollar-denominated assets. This increased the demand for dollars and decreased the demand for the euro, driving the value of the euro down.
The fortunes of the euro began improving in late 2001 when the dollar weakened; the currency stood at a robust all-time high of €1 = $1.54 in early March 2008. One reason for the rise in the value of the euro was that the flow of capital into the United States stalled as the U.S. financial markets fell during 2007 and 2008.16 Many investors were now taking money out of the United States, selling dollar-denominated assets such as U.S. stocks and bonds, and purchasing euro-denominated assets. Falling demand for U.S. dollars and rising demand for euros translated into a fall in the value of the dollar against the euro. Furthermore, in a vote of confidence in both the euro and the ability of the ECB to manage monetary policy within the euro zone, many foreign central banks added more euros to their supply of foreign currencies. In the first three years of its life, the euro never reached the 13 percent of global reserves made up by the deutsche mark and other former euro zone currencies. The euro didn’t jump that hurdle until early 2002, but by 2011 it stood at 26.3 percent.17
Since 2008 however, the euro has weakened, reflecting persistent concerns over slow economic growth and large budget deficits among several EU member-states, particularly Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, and Spain. During the 2000s, all of these governments had sharply increased their government debt to finance public spending. Government debt as a percentage of GDP hit record levels in many of these nations. By 2010, private investors became increasingly concerned that many of these nations would not be able to service their sovereign debt, particularly given the economic slowdown following the 2008–2009 global financial crisis. They sold off government bonds of troubled nations, driving down bond prices and driving up the cost of government borrowing (bond prices and interest rates are inversely related). This led to fears that several national governments, particularly Greece, might default on their sovereign debt, plunging the euro zone into an economic crisis. To try and stave off such a sovereign debt crisis, in May 2010 the euro zone nations and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to a €110 billion bailout package to help rescue Greece. In November 2010, the EU and IMF agreed to a bailout package for Ireland of €85 billion; in May 2011, euro zone countries and the IMF instituted a €78 billion bailout plan for Portugal. In return for these loans, all three countries had to agree to sharp reductions in government spending, which meant slower economic growth and high unemployment until government debt was reduced to more sustainable levels. While Italy and Spain did not request bailout packages, both countries were forced by falling bond prices to institute austerity programs that required big reductions in government spending. The euro zone nations also set up a permanent bailout fund—the European Stability Mechanism—worth about €500 billion, which was designed to restore confidence in the euro. As detailed in the next Country Focus, by early 2012 Greece had been granted two more bailout packages in an attempt to forestall a full-blown default on payment of its sovereign debt.
As might be expected, the economic turmoil led to a decline in the value of the euro. By early 2012, the dollar euro exchange rate stood at €1 = $1.32, some way below its 2008 level but still significantly better than the exchange rate in early 2000. The euro also declined by 20 to 30 percent against most of the world’s other major currencies between late 2008 and 2012.
More troubling perhaps for the long run success of the euro, many of the newer EU nations that had committed to adopting the euro put their plans on hold. Countries like Poland and the Czech Republic had no desire to join the euro zone and then have their taxpayers help bail out the profligate governments of countries like Greece. To compound matters, the sovereign debt crisis had exposed a deep flaw in the euro zone—it was difficult for fiscally more conservative nations like Germany to limit profligate spending by the governments of other nations that might subsequently create strains and impose costs on the entire euro zone. The Germans in particular found themselves in the unhappy position of having to underwrite loans to bail out the governments of Greece, Portugal, and Ireland. This started to erode support for the euro in the stronger EU states. To try and correct this flaw, 25 of the EU’s 27 nations signed a fiscal pact in January 2012 that made it more difficult for member-states to break tight new rules on government deficits (the UK and Czech Republic abstained). Whether such actions will be sufficient to get the euro back on track remains to be seen.
