“The lack of self-sufficiency and the division of labor theses, when coupled with the development of a luxurious city-state, make it clear that one important role which will need to be fulfilled is that of the “guardians.” Without appropriate guardians, the ideally just state will be impossible. While, of course, each role is important, Plato’s Socrates will focus upon the guardians (and rulers) as it is this role which has not been properly defined and fulfilled in extant states. He believes that the sort of role and knowledge necessary for farmers, iron workers, potters, shoemakers, shepherds, etc., is already well-known and does not require investigation or discussion. The fact that we don’t have just states is to be explained by the fact that our guardians and rulers are not rightly trained (and, in fact, not rightly characterized). Thus, this section focuses upon what those who would fulfill this task must be like.
5. The rulers, the noble fiction, and the guard dog problem [412c-417a]:
In book 5 Plato’s Socrates distinguishes the overall group of guardians into two classes: the auxiliaries and the rulers. He also deals with several problems which both his characterization of these classes and his educational program for them seem to pose.
The guard dog problem:
416 “The most terrible and most shameful thing of all is for a shepherd to rear dogs as auxiliaries to help with his flocks in such a way that through licentiousness, hunger, or some other bad trait of character, they do evil to the sheep and become like wolves instead of dogs.”
Book 5 summary
Star Trek “The Cloud Minders” scene.
Torture, according to international law, is “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” In addition to state-sponsored torture, individuals or groups may inflict torture on others for similar reasons.
Throughout history, torture was a method of political re-education. In the 21st century, torture is widely considered to be a violation of human rights, and prohibited by article 5 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In times of war signatories of the Third Geneva Convention and Fourth Geneva Convention agree not to torture protected persons (POWs and enemy civilians) in armed conflicts.
International legal prohibitions on torture derive from a philosophical consensus that torture and ill-treatment are repugnant, abhorrent, and immoral. A further moral definition of torture proposes that torture consists in the disproportionate infliction of pain. Organizations that monitor abuses of human rights, such as Amnesty International, report a widespread use of torture condoned by states in many regions of the world.
Just War theory is a doctrine which holds that a conflict can meet the criteria of philosophical, religious or political justice, provided it follows certain conditions. The doctrine of the “just war” has its foundations in ancient Greek society and was first developed in the Christian tradition by Augustine in The City of God. Augustine reacted to the absolutist pacifist strain of Christian ethics based on the doctrine of “Turn the other cheek” espoused by Jesus of Nazareth (Matthew 5:38-48). The “just war” doctrine can best be understood in the context of the “pacifism-just war” debate which continues to divide Christian and other ethical theorists. It can also be compared to other theories which attempt to justify war, such as Realism (Realpolitik).
“Just War theory” encompasses modern political doctrines which promote the view that a specific war is just given satisfactory conditions. As “conditions” tend to be variable, open to interpretation, and otherwise subject to political obfuscation, the concept of Just War itself, even apart from any specific formulated doctrines, is controversial.]
While proponents claim such views have a long tradition, critics claim the application of Just War is only relativistic, and directly contradicts more universal philosophical traditions such as the Ethic of reciprocity
Just War theorists combine both a moral abhorrence towards war with a readiness to accept that war may sometimes be necessary to for self-defense. The criteria of the just war tradition “is an attempt to distinguish between justifiable and unjustifiable uses of organized armed forces. Just War theories attempt to conceive of how the use of arms might be restrained, made more humane, and ultimately directed towards the aim of establishing lasting peace and justice.” 
The idea that resorting to war can only be just under certain conditions goes back at least to Cicero.  HYPERLINK “http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Augustine_of_Hippo” \o “Augustine of Hippo” Augustine of Hippo HYPERLINK “http://olympia.anglican.org/churches/B/stdunstan/Beliefs/Christians_War/Christians_War_2.htm” \o “http://olympia.anglican.org/churches/B/stdunstan/Beliefs/Christians_War/Christians_War_2.htm” , Thomas Aquinas HYPERLINK “http://olympia.anglican.org/churches/B/stdunstan/Beliefs/Christians_War/Christians_War_3.htm” \o “http://olympia.anglican.org/churches/B/stdunstan/Beliefs/Christians_War/Christians_War_3.htm”  and Hugo Grotius later codified a set of rules for a just war, which today still encompass the points commonly debated, with some modifications.
The Just War tradition addresses the morality of the use of force in two parts: when it is right to resort to armed force (the concern of jus ad bellum ) and what is acceptable in using such force (the concern of jus in bello ).  In more recent years, a third category — jus post bellum — has been added, which governs the justice of war termination and peace agreements, as well as the trying of war criminals.
In modern language, these rules hold that, in order to be just, a war must meet the following criteria before the use of force (jus ad bellum):
The reason for going to war needs to be just and can therefore be recapturing things taken or punishing people who have done wrong. A contemporary view of just cause was expressed in 1993 when the US Catholic Conference said: “Force may be used only to correct a grave, public evil, i.e., aggression or massive violation of the basic human rights of whole populations.”
While there may be rights and wrongs on all sides of a conflict, to override the presumption against the use of force, the injustice suffered by one party must significantly outweigh that suffered by the other. Theorists such as Brian Orend omit this term, seeing it as fertile ground for exploitation by bellicose regimes.
Only duly constituted public authorities may use deadly force or wage war
Force may be used only in a truly just cause and solely for that purpose—correcting a suffered wrong is considered a right intention, while material gain or maintaining economies is not.
Probability of success
Arms may not be used in a futile cause or in a case where disproportionate measures are required to achieve success;
Force may be used only after all peaceful and viable alternatives have been seriously tried and exhausted.
Note that these are only the most typical conditions cited by just war theorists.
Once war has begun, just war theory also directs how combatants are to act: (Jus in bello)
Just war conduct should be governed by the principle of discrimination. The acts of war should be directed towards the inflictors of the wrong, and not towards civilians caught in circumstances they did not create. The prohibited acts include bombing civilian residential areas that include no military target and committing acts of terrorism or reprisal against ordinary civilians. Some believe that this rule forbids weapons of mass destruction of any kind, for any reason (such as the use of an atomic bomb).
Just war conduct should be governed by the principle of proportionality. The force used must be proportional to the wrong endured, and to the possible good that may come. The more disproportional the number of collateral civilian deaths, the more suspect will be the sincerity of a belligerent nation’s claim to justness of a war it initiated.
Just war conduct should be governed by the principle of minimum force. This principle is meant to limit excessive and unnecessary death and destruction. It is different from proportionality because the amount of force proportionate to the goal of the mission might exceed the amount of force necessary to accomplish that mission.
In recent years, some theorists, such as Gary Bass, Louis Iasiello and Brian Orend, have proposed a third category within Just War theory. Jus post bellum concerns justice after a war, including peace treaties, reconstruction, war crimes trials, and war reparations. Orend, for instance, proposes the following principles:
Just cause for termination
A state may terminate a war if there has been a reasonable vindication of the rights that were violated in the first place, and if the aggressor is willing to negotiate the terms of surrender. These terms of surrender include a formal apology, compensations, war crimes trials and perhaps rehabilitation.
A state must only terminate a war under the conditions agreed upon in the above criteria. Revenge is not permitted. The victor state must also be willing to apply the same level of objectivity and investigation into any war crimes its armed forces may have committed.
Public declaration and authority
The terms of peace must be made by a legitimate authority, and the terms must be accepted by a legitimate authority.
The victor state is to differentiate between political and military leaders, and combatants and civilians. Punitive measures are to be limited to those directly responsible for the conflict.
Any terms of surrender must be proportional to the rights that were initially violated. Draconian measures, absolutionist crusades and any attempt at denying the surrendered country the right to participate in the world community are not permitted.
See also: Views on the 2003 invasion of Iraq
The run up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq posed the question whether the war was just. Debaters came to quite different conclusions because they put different interpretations on how the just war criteria should be applied. Supporters of the war tended to accept the US position that the enforcement of UN resolutions was sufficient authority or even, as in the case of the Land Letter, that the United States as a sovereign nation could count as legitimate authority. Opponents of the war tended to interpret legitimate authority as requiring a specific Security Council resolution